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1 [1999] 2 SCR 817 (hereinafter Baker).
2 Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11;
RSC 1985 Appendix II, No 44 (hereinafter Charter).
3 [2001] 2 SCR 241 (hereinafter Hudson).
4 [2002]1 SCR 3 (hereinafter Suresh).
5 One must not confuse the domestic legal effect of treaties and that of customary international
law; in Canada, the former is generally considered dualist and the latter is generally
considered monist. According to the dualist theory, international law is only applicable
domestically if there has been some kind of incorporation in the domestic legal order, the two
systems being considered as separate. Pursuant to the monist theory, the rule is that
‘international law forms part of the law of the land’, without any need of internal
implementation, a position based on the view that both laws are fundamentally part of the
same legal system. Monism can take one of two forms: either that international law has
primacy over domestic law or, the other way around, that municipal law trumps international
law. The author Hans Kelsen is the most notorious defender of the monist theory, and he
favoured the former form of monism; see Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des
Völkerrechts—Beitrag zu einer Reinen Rechtslehre, H. Kelsen (Tübingen: Mohr, 1920) at 102 et
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In the case of Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),1 in 1999,
the Supreme Court of Canada clearly expressed the view that the principles
and values reflected in international conventional law, albeit not
implemented into the domestic law of the country, should inform the
contextual interpretation of Canadian legislation. This reasoning falls within
the broader strategy in favour of taking into account international law in the
interpretation of statutes and other instruments like the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.2 A similar approach was adopted by the majority of the
Court in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town)3
and unanimously in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).4
These decisions were construed as challenging the traditional Canadian
position, based on the so-called dualist approach to international conven-
tions,5 which requires that treaty norms be implemented through legislation
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seq.; and, H. Kelsen, ‘La transformation du droit international en droit interne’, 43 Rev Gén D
Int’l Pub 5 (1936). See also, generally, H. Triepel, Droit international et droit interne (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1920) at 73 et seq.; H. Triepel, ‘Les rapports entre le droit interne et le
droit international’, 1 Rec C Acad D Int’l 73 (1923); and, G. Sperduti, ‘Dualism and Monism: A
Confrontation to be Overcome?’ 3 Italian YB Int’l L 31 (1977). Finally, it is noteworthy that
these dualist and monist theories are closely linked to the fundamental question of the sources
and foundations of our legal order; see on this issue, L. Ferrari-Bravo, ‘International and
Municipal Law: The Complementary of Legal Systems’, in R. St.J. Macdonald and D. M.
Johnston (eds) The Structure and Process of International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983)
at 715.
6 See R. St.J. Macdonald, ‘The Relationship Between International Law and Domestic Law in
Canada’, in R. St.J. Macdonald et al. (eds), Canadian Perspectives on International Law and
Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 88; A. Desjardins, ‘La mise en
oeuvre au Canada des traités relatifs aux droits de la personne’, 12 Rev Générale D 359 (1981);
I. Weiser, ‘Effect in Domestic Law of International Human Rights Treaties Ratified without
Implementing Legislation’, 27 Canadian Council Int’l L Proc 132 (1998); W. A. Schabas,
‘Twenty-Five Years of Public International Law at the Supreme Court of Canada’, 79 Canadian
Bar Rev 174 (2000); S. J. Toope, ‘Inside and Out: The Stories of International Law and Domestic
Law’, 50 UNB LJ 11 (2001); S. J. Toope, ‘The Uses of Metaphor: International Law and the
Supreme Court of Canada’, 80 Can Bar Rev 534 (2001); B. Conforti, ‘Notes on the Relationship
between International Law and National Law’, 3 Int’l L Forum 18 (2001); and, H. Kindred, ‘The
Use of Unimplemented Treaties in Canada: Practice and Prospects in the Supreme Court’, in
S. G. Coughlan and D. Russell (eds), Citizenship and Citizen Participation in the Administration of
Justice (Montreal: Thémis 2002) at 263.
7 Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario [1937] AC 326 (PC) (hereinafter
Labour Conventions).
8 For comments on this case, see N. A. M. Mackenzie, ‘Canada: The Treaty-Making Power’, 18
British YB Int’l L 172 (1937); N. A. M. Mackenzie, ‘Canada and the Treaty-Making Power’, 15
Canadian Bar Rev 436 (1937); F. R. Scott, ‘The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions’, 15
Canadian Bar Rev 485 (1937); A. B. Elkin, ‘De la compétence du Canada pour conclure les
traités internationaux—Étude sur le statut juridique des Dominions britanniques, 45 Rev gén
D Int’l pub 658 (1938); F. R. Scott, ‘Labour Conventions Case: Lord Wright’s Undisclosed
Dissent’, 34 Canadian Bar Rev 114 (1956); G. J. Szablowski, ‘Creation and Implementation of
Treaties in Canada’, 34 Canadian Bar Rev 28 (1956); E. McWhinney, ‘Federal Constitutional
Law and the Treaty-Making Power’, 35 Canadian Bar Rev 842 (1957); E. McWhinney, ‘The
Constitutional Competence within Federal Systems as to International Agreements’, 1
Canadian Leg St 145 (1964–68); G. L. Morris, ‘The Treaty-Making Power: A Canadian
Dilemma’ 45 Canadian Bar Rev 478 (1967); E. McWhinney, ‘Canadian Federalism: Foreign
Affairs and Treaty Power. The Impact of Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution”’ 7 Canadian YB Int’l L 3
(1969); A. Dufour, ‘Fédéralisme canadien et droit international’, in R. St.J. Macdonald et al.
(eds), Canadian Perspectives on International Law and Organization (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1974) at 72; A. M. Jacomy-Millette, ‘L’État fédéré dans les relations
internationales contemporaines: le cas du Canada’, 14 Canadian YB Int’l L 20 (1976); and, J.-Y.
Morin, ‘La personnalité internationale du Québec’, 1 Rev québécoise D Int’l 163 (1984).
9 Labour Conventions at 347.
in order to have legal effect on domestic law.6 This rule of British origin was
set out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the 1937 Labour
Conventions case,7 where Lord Atkin famously wrote:8 ‘Within the British
Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an
executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration
of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action.’9
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10 It is interesting to note that, unlike the situation in Australia, there is no distinct federal power
to incorporate treaties in Canada. The Australian courts have indeed interpreted broadly the
competence of the Commonwealth Parliament over ‘external affairs’ in order to include the
authority to incorporate treaty obligations generally; see J. W. Perry, ‘At the Intersection—
Australian and International Law’, 71 Australian LJ 841 (1997); and S. Donaghue, ‘Balancing
Sovereignty and International Law: The Domestic Impact of International Law in Australia’,
17 Adelaide L Rev 213 (1995).
11 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict c 3. See also Labour Conventions case, at 351, where Lord Atkin said: ‘For the
purposes of [ . . . ] the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the
Provinces, there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The distribution is based on
classes of subjects; and as a treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so will the legislative
power of performing it be ascertained.’
12 [2002] 2 SCR 269 (hereinafter Schreiber).
13 RSC 1985, c S-18 (hereinafter Act).
14 Can. TS 1979 No 18, entered into force on 30 September 1979.
Within the federal constitutional system of Canada,10 such legislative
transformation of treaty obligations must be done by the legislative authority
competent on the matter, under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act
1867.11
On 12 September 2002, the Supreme Court handed down its unanimous
judgment in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General),12 which essentially raised a
question of sovereign immunity; it is the State Immunity Act13 which
implemented this principle of international customary law, as well as its
exceptions, into the Canadian legal order. This case revolved around the
interpretation of domestic statutory provisions, having regard to inter-
national law. More particularly, the Court had to decide whether the
exceptions found in sections 4 and 6(a) of the Act, which limit the general
principle of sovereign immunity in section 3(1), applied in the circumstances
at hand. What is most interesting to consider is whether the reasons given by
the Court signal a change of attitude vis-à-vis the use international law as a
material contextual element in legislative interpretation.
The paper begins by briefly reviewing the facts of the Schreiber case, gives a
succinct account of the judgment, and then focuses on the role of international
law in the interpretation of statutes, and other instruments like the Charter in
Canada.
1. Schreiber: factual context
The case is linked to a broader dispute about allegedly suspicious trans-
actions for the purchase of aircraft involving the Canadian government when
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was in office in the 1990s. The appellant
Schreiber was a business person and a Canadian citizen against whom the
Federal Republic of Germany issued an arrest warrant in 1999. Under the
Extradition Treaty between Canada and Germany,14 a request was then made
for the provisional arrest of Schreiber and his extradition to face charges of tax
evasion and other offences in Germany. The appellant was thus duly arrested
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15 SC 1999, c 18.
16 (2000), 48 OR (3d) 521.
17 (2001), 52 OR (3d) 577.
18 Schreiber, at paras 13 et seq.
19 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at
289; and, R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol 1, 9th edn (London:
Longman, 1996) at 341–43.
20 26 June 1945, TS No 993, Can. TS 1945 No 7, reproduced in Blackstone’s International Law
Documents, 3rd edn (London: Blackstone Press, 1996) 8, at 8, which states as its first principle,
in article 2: ‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.’
pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant granted under the Extradition Act15
and spent eight days in jail until he was released on bail.
Later the same year, Schreiber sued the respondents, Germany and the
Attorney General of Canada, seeking one million dollars in damages for
personal injuries resulting from his arrest and detention. His statement of claim
alleged breaches of duties of care, abuse of public office, bad faith, and breach
of his rights under the Charter. Germany brought a motion requesting that
the action be dismissed on the basis of the principle of sovereign immunity.
The Attorney General of Canada also brought a motion seeking a stay of
proceedings pending the decision in the case between Schreiber and
Germany. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed both motions,16 a
decision upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.17 Only the issue of
sovereign immunity was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
2. Schreiber: decision of the Court
The only question before the Court, therefore, was whether or not the waiver
of immunity exception in section 4 of the Act or the personal injury exception
in section 6(a) of the Act applied, thereby depriving Germany of its sovereign
immunity from judicial proceedings in Canada otherwise recognized under
section 3(1) of the same Act. The answer given by the Court, unanimously,
was negative and the appeal was dismissed.
Justice LeBel, who wrote the reasons for the Court, began by examining the
international law origins and scope of the principle of sovereign immunity.18
He pointed out that the idea had developed from the Vattellian doctrine of the
law of nations which regulated the Westphalian system of international
relations based on the notion of sovereignty and equality of states,19 and was
crystallized in the Charter of the United Nations.20 Sovereignty immunity,
wrote LeBel J, would find justification in the old Latin maxim par in parem
imperium non habet (an equal has no authority over an equal). This principle of
international law was recognized and applied by states; domestic courts do
not exercise jurisdiction in actions against foreign states (although they may
act as plaintiffs in domestic courts as a matter of comity).
This general principle has been attenuated over the years and some
exceptions to sovereign immunity have emerged. Evidence of developments
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21 11 ILM 470 (1972).
22 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-third session, UN Doc
A/46/10, reproduced in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol 2 (New York: United
Nations, 1991), part 2, at 13 (hereinafter Draft Articles).
23 Schreiber, at para. 17.
24 Ibid. at para. 27.
25 See Re Canada Labour Code [1992] 2 SCR 50; and, Government de la République démocratique du
Congo v. Venne [1971] SCR 997.
toward a more restrictive approach to immunity at international law can be
found in the Council of Europe’s European Convention on State Immunity21
and the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and their Property and Commentaries Thereto,22 as well
as in the domestic legislation of several jurisdictions, including the USA, the
UK, Australia, and Canada (which adopted the State Immunity Act). Justice
LeBel insisted, however, that ‘the general principle of sovereign immunity
remains an important part of the international legal order, except when
expressly stated otherwise’.23
The Court then examined the two heads of exceptions under the Act that
could here limit sovereign immunity. Under section 4, the waiver of
immunity exception could not apply because Germany did not initiate the
judicial proceedings on which the appellant based his torts liability action.
Although Germany did initiate the extradition, this procedure is separate and
distinct from the request to arrest and imprison Schreiber (the basis for his
suit); actually, the request for extradition was made by the Minister of Justice
who authorized the Attorney General of Canada to obtain a provisional
warrant for his arrest. Furthermore, the review/appellate provision in section
4 of the Act was deemed irrelevant given that the present case did not fall
within the waiver of immunity exception in the first place. Such conclusions,
added LeBel J, would be in line with the concepts of comity and mutual
respect between nations.24
The other immunity exception invoked by the appellant is found in section
6(a) of the Act: ‘A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court
in any proceedings that relate to any death or personal injury.’ He submitted
that the mental distress, denial of liberty, and damage to reputation he
suffered due to his wrongful arrest and imprisonment constituted a personal
injury under this exception, resulting in Germany’s sovereign immunity
being set aside in his tort liability action. This argument was rejected by
Justice LeBel following a rigorous interpretation of the provision at hand,
including the complex bilingual and bijural ramifications of the legislation.
First, it was held that the common law distinction between acts of
government (acta jure imperii) and acts of a commercial nature (acta jure
gestionis), which operates to limit sovereign immunity with respect to the
former and not the latter, has never been accepted in Canada25 and was
certainly not incorporated in the statutory exception in section 6(a). In any
event, this distinction would be irrelevant because, inter alia, the wording of
the provision expressly provides that the exception applies to all wrongful
MFK-Mendip Job ID: 9932BK--0027-2   4 -    24 Rev: 31-10-2003 PAGE: 1 TIME: 13:38 SIZE: 63,09 Area: JNLS OP: JG
9932 – OUP: STATUTE LAW REVIEW (25:1)
STATUTE LAW REVIEW24
26 Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs,
Issue No 12, 19 April 1981, at p. 12:9.
27 See, generally, S. Beaulac, ‘Recent Developments at the Supreme Court of Canada on the Use
of Parliamentary Debates’, 63 Saskatchewan L Rev 581 (2000); and, S. Beaulac, ‘Parliamentary
Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or of Weight?’, 43 McGill LJ
287 (1998).
28 Schreiber, at para. 38.
29 Ibid.
30 United States of America v. Friedland (1999) 182 DLR (4th) 614 (Ont. CA); and, Walker v. Bank of
New York Inc. (1994) 16 OR (3d) 504 (Ont. CA).
31 See K. D. Cooper-Stephenson and I. B. Saunders, Personal Injury Damages in Canada (Toronto:
Carswell, 1981) at 5.
32 Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1972.
33 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc A/CONF 39/26, adopted 23 May
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980; reprinted in 8 ILM 679 (1969), and Can. TS 1980 No 37,
conducts by a foreign state which cause death or personal injury. Justice LeBel
used parliamentary material to support this conclusion, namely the evidence
presented by M. L. Jewell of the Constitutional and International Law Section,
Department of Justice, before the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs.26 This consultation confirms the trend at the Supreme
Court of resorting to travaux préparatoires in statutory interpretation, even
though the provision is not ambiguous (which was the old preliminary
condition).27
Now, as LeBel J wrote, the main issue is whether ‘the term “personal
injury” in section 6(a) of the State Immunity Act applies only to claims of
physical injury’,28 or whether it applies ‘to wrongful arrest and imprison-
ment’.29 The appellant argued that there are conflicting judgments by the
Court of Appeal for Ontario on the meaning of the provision at hand,30 and
submitted that Canadian law has recognized that imprisonment, as well as
the suffering of mental distress and damage to one’s reputation, are injuries to
the person, which should be included in the section 6(a) exception. The
respondents countered that there was no personal injury within the meaning
of the provision in this case.
The Court agreed with the respondents that the applicable case law in
Anglo-Canadian common law, which is to the same effect as academic
writings,31 indicates that personal injury generally means physical injury. It is
for the purpose of further supporting such interpretation of ‘personal injury’
in section 6(a) of the Act that Justice LeBel considered international law,
including what was referred to as secondary sources of international law (the
International Law Commission commentaries on its Draft Articles and the
Council of Europe’s Explanatory Reports on the European Convention on
State Immunity and the Additional Protocol)32 and the material submitted by
Amnesty International on international human rights law.
For the discussion that follows, it is this passage of the reasons that is of
particular interest, especially the remarks in response to the arguments
founded upon international human rights law. Justice LeBel opined that
Amnesty International’s argument required a conclusion that there was a
peremptory norm (otherwise known as ius cogens)33 of customary international
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defines a peremptory norm at article 53: ‘For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character’; see also, concerning new rules of ius cogens, art 64. The possible existence of
such overriding principles of international law was alluded to by the majority of the
International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase), ICJ Reports (1970) 3,
at 32. See also, on ius cogens, L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International
Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status (Helsinki: Lakimiedliiten Kustannus, 1988).
34 Justice LeBel wrote, in Schreiber, at para. 49: ‘Although I agree with some of the submissions of
the intervener with respect to the fact that mental injury may be compensable in some form at
international law, neither the intervener nor any other party has established that a peremptory
norm of international law has now come into existence which would completely oust the doctrine
of state immunity and allow domestic courts to entertain claims in the circumstances of this
case’ [emphasis added].
35 Schreiber, at para. 50 [emphasis added by LeBel J].
36 Schreiber, at para. 51.
37 Ibid.
38 Below n 116, and accompanying text.
law prevailing over the principle of sovereign immunity, that is, a norm
calling for the extension of the concept of physical injury to include mental
injury within the section 6(a) exception to sovereign immunity. In refusing to
recognize such a norm,34 LeBel J expressed the following view:
In the case at bar, there is no conflict between the principles of
international law, at the present stage of their development, and those of
the domestic legal order. International law sets out some general
principles with respect to the origins and uses of sovereign immunity,
but the domestic law sets out very specific exceptions to the general rule
of sovereign immunity. A judgment of this Court, Daniels v. White [1968]
SCR 517, sets out when international law is appropriately used to
interpret domestic legislation. In that case, Pigeon J held at p. 541 that:
. . . this is a case for the application of the rule of construction that
Parliament is not presumed to legislate in breach of a treaty or in any
manner inconsistent with the comity of nations and the established
rules of international law. It is a rule that is not often applied, because if a
statute is unambiguous, its provisions must be followed even if they are
contrary to international law . . ..35
Justice LeBel held that ‘there would be little utility in examining international
legal principles in detail’36 because, here, there is no conflict between domestic
law and international law given that the domestic legislation is more specific
than the rule of international law, and because the issue is about the
interpretation of the Act and not about international legal principles.37
This part of the decision is considered again later.38 Having clearly stated
that the crux of the matter was the interpretation of the domestic law found in
section 6(a) of the Act, LeBel J examined the term ‘personal injury’ in both the
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39 Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act No. 1, SC 2001, c 4 (hereinafter Harmonization
Act).
40 Ibid, at s 121.
41 [2001] 1 SCR 45.
42 Schreiber, at para. 54.
43 2nd edn (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87.
44 In recent years, to refer to just a few, see Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42,
at para. 26 (hereinafter Bell ExpressVu); Francis v. Baker [1999] 3 SCR 250, at para. 34; and Rizzo
& Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para. 21.
45 E. A. Driedger, above n 43 at 87.
46 3rd edn (Montreal: Carswell, 2000) at 327.
47 Schreiber, at para. 56.
48 SQ 1991, c 64.
English and French versions of the provision, as well as the bijural
ramifications of the federal legislation at issue. The latter involved taking into
account the meaning of this expression in the Quebec civil law and
considering the new English version of section 6(a), as amended by the
Harmonization Act,39 which now reads: ‘any death or personal or bodily
injury’.40
In terms of statutory interpretation, generally, Justice LeBel referred to R. v.
Sharpe41 to support the proposition that the proper way to construe legislation
‘is to read its words in their entire context and in their grammatical and
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act
and the intention of Parliament’.42 This pronouncement is certainly borrowed
from Driedger’s Construction of Statutes,43 repeatedly quoted by the Supreme
Court,44 which reads: ‘Today there is only one principle or approach, namely,
the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act,
the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.’45
Furthermore, since the two versions of federal statutes are equally
authoritative, any ambiguity must be resolved by finding an interpretation
common to both versions. Referring to Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of
Legislation in Canada,46 Justice LeBel wrote that ‘where one version is
ambiguous and the other is clear and unequivocal, the common meaning of
the two versions would a priori be preferred’ and that ‘where one of the two
versions is broader than the other, the common meaning would favour the
more restricted or limited meaning’.47 Thus the French version of section 6(a)
of the Act, which speaks of ‘décès’ or ‘dommages corporels’, should be favoured
over the English version because it is clearer and more restrictive.
This interpretation, which refuses to include more than physical injury in the
section 6(a) exception to sovereignty immunity, is also supported by a bijural
consideration of the legislative context of the provision. The Quebec civil law
uses the category of ‘préjudice corporel—bodily injury’ as part of the
organizing classification of damages in the province’s civil responsibility
scheme, along with damages that are ‘moral or material in nature’. This
tripartite classification was set out clearly in article 1457 of the Civil Code of
Quebec,48 but as LeBel J explained, the bodily injury category existed long
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49 Schreiber, at paras 60–65.
50 This is based also on the federal documents, prepared by the Department of Justice of Canada,
entitled The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and
Canadian Bijuralism, booklet 4, by L. M. Wellington, ‘Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization
Methodology and Terminology’ (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2001) at 9–10; and, Bijural
Terminology Records (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2001) at 95.
51 Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol 137, 1st session, 37th Parliament, 7 May 2001, at
3640, where Minister McLellan said: ‘Let me be clear that Bill S–4 does not create substantive
rights or enshrine any new individual or collective rights’.
52 Schreiber, at paras 73–74.
before the adoption of the new code in 1991.49 This civil law concept supports
the conclusion according to which the ambit of section 6(a) of the Act is
limited to injuries involving interference with the physical integrity of a person
and does not include breach of rights of a moral nature.
Lastly, the Harmonization Act—which amendments are considered for the
first time by the Court—does not command another meaning for section 6(a)
of the Act. Justice LeBel noted that the redundancy created by the inclusion of
‘bodily injury’ with ‘personal injury’ was only intended to clarify the
exception to sovereign immunity for the anglophone civil law audience.50
Once again, using parliamentary materials—this time, remarks by Anne
McLellan, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada when the bill
was moved for the second reading51—it was held that the purpose of the
amendment was not the creation of substantive rights. It follows also that the
statutory interpretation principles about redundant drafting, especially the
presumption against tautology, have no relevance here.52
3. Discussion
This paper seeks to examine whether the reasons given in Schreiber for
brushing aside international human rights law and refusing to extend the
scope of section 6(a) of the Act should be viewed as a change of heart by the
Supreme Court with regard to the use of international law in interpreting
statutes and other instruments like the Charter. The argument was that there
exists a customary norm of international law, which would even be
peremptory (i.e. a principle of ius cogens), commanding an interpretation of
the Canadian legislation that included the protection of mental integrity
through the exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity.
This issue must be considered in relation to the modern approach to
international law in legislative interpretation and, in particular, the recent
developments with the decisions in Baker, Hudson and Suresh.
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53 [1968] SCR 517, at 541. See also C.A.P.A.C. v. CTV Television Network [1968] SCR 676.
54 At para. 50. See also above n 35.
55 See, generally, E. D. Dickinson, ‘L’interprétation et l’application du droit international dans les
pays anglo-américains’, 40 Rec C Acad D Int’l 305 (1932); A. D. McNair, ‘L’application et
l’interprétation des traités d’après la jurisprudence britannique’, 43 Rec C Acad D Int’l 247
(1933); I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990) at 43–48; and, P. Daillier and A. Pellet (eds), Nguyen Quoc Dinh—Droit international
public, 5ème éd. (Paris: Librairie général de droit et de jurisprudence, 1994), at 226 et seq.
56 [1939] AC 160.
57 Ibid, at 168 [emphasis added].
58 Above n 53.
59 [1988] 1 SCR 950.
60 Ibid, at 958 [emphasis added].
61 [1990] 2 SCR 1324.
62 Ibid, at 1371.
3.1. International law and domestic statutory interpretation
Generally, it is the judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court in Daniels v.
White53—referred to by LeBel J in Schreiber54—which is deemed the starting
point to any discussion on the principles of statutory interpretation when
international law is involved in a case. However, one can trace back the
restrictiveness of the Canadian approach to the British constitutional practice
on the use of international norms.55 On behalf of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in Chung Chi Cheung v. The Queen,56 Lord Atkin explained the
traditional rule thus:
The Courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations
accept amongst themselves. On any judicial issue they seek to ascertain
what the relevant rule is, and, having found it, they will treat it as
incorporated into domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules
enacted by statutes or finally determined by their tribunals.57
The problem with this statement is that it begs the question of when
international law should be overridden by inconsistent statutes or case law.
However, since Daniels v. White58 in the late 1960s, and especially with cases
in the late 1980s onward, a change of approach in favour of a more liberal
statutory interpretation can be identified at the Supreme Court, which
increasingly resorted to international law to help construe domestic legis-
lation. In 1988, La Forest J stated in R. v. Parisien:59 ‘In interpreting this
undertaking, it must, as in the case of other terms in international agreements,
be read in context and in light of its object and purpose as well as in light of the
general principles of international law’.60 In the 1990 case of National Corn Growers
Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal),61 Gonthier J held: ‘Indeed, where the text of
the domestic law lends itself to it, one should also strive to expound an
interpretation which is consonant with the relevant international obli-
gations.’62 He further held:
The suggestion that recourse can be had to an underlying international
agreement where a latent ambiguity can be asserted implies that there is
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63 Ibid, at 1372 [emphasis in original].
64 [1998] 3 SCR 437.
65 Ibid, at 526.
66 [1992] 2 SCR 50.
67 Ibid, at 76.
68 [1993] 2 SCR 689.
69 RSC 1985, c I–2 (hereinafter Immigration Act).
70 189 UNTS 150, signed 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954; reprinted in Can. TS 1969
No 6 (hereinafter Refugees Convention).
71 [1994] 3 SCR 551.
72 Ibid, at 578.
73 [1998] 1 SCR 982.
no need to find a patent ambiguity before consultation of the agreement
is possible. As a latent ambiguity must arise out of matters external to
the text to be interpreted, such an international agreement may be used,
as I have just suggested, as the preliminary stage of determining if an
ambiguity exists.63
Accordingly, a treaty can be used in all circumstances, not only after the
legislative provision at hand was held to be ambiguous. ‘Although inter-
national law is not binding upon Parliamentary of the provincial legislatures,’
as Justices Iacobucci and Major observed in Ordon Estate v. Grail,64 ‘a court
must presume that legislation is intended to comply with Canada’s obli-
gations under international instruments and as a member of the international
community.’65
In Re Canada Labour Code,66 the Supreme Court applied the State Immunity
Act—as in the Schreiber case—and granted only a limited sovereign immunity
to state activities. For the majority, Justice La Forest observed that ‘the proper
approach to characterizing state activity is to view it in its entire context’,67
which of course included its international law context. In Canada (Attorney
General) v. Ward,68 again La Forest J made an extensive use of international
legal sources in interpreting the refugee provisions of the Immigration Act,69
which incorporated the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees70 into
the Canadian legal order. The following year, in Thomson v. Thomson,71 La
Forest noted:
It would be odd if in construing an international treaty to which the
legislature has attempted to give effect, the treaty were not interpreted
in the manner in which the state parties to the treaty must have
intended. Not surprisingly, then, the parties [to the case at bar] made
frequent reference to this supplementary means of interpreting the
Convention [on Child Abduction], and I shall also do so.72
Indeed, if there is one type of situation where international law undoubtedly
ought to act as an aid to interpretation, it is when the enactment implements
international treaty obligations.
More recently, in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),73 it is Justice Bastarache who stated that there were obvious
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74 Ibid, at 1019–20.
75 1155 UNTS 331, adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, reprinted in Can. TS
1980 No 37, at arts 31 and 32.
76 See S. J. Toope, ‘Canada and International Law’, 27 Canadian Council Int’l L Proc 33 (1998); W.
A. Schabas, International Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter, 2nd edn (Scarborough,
Can.: Carswell, 1996); A. F. Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law: Use in Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992); M. Lebel, ‘L’interprétation de la
Charte canadienne des droits et libertés au regard du droit international des droits de la
personne—Critique de la démarche suivie par la Cour suprême du Canada’, 48 R du B 743
(1988); G. Zellick, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: Its Significance for Charter
Litigation’, in R. J. Sharpe (ed.), Charter Litigation (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths,
1987) at 97; M. A. Hayward, ‘International Law and the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms: Uses and Justifications’, 23 U Western Ont L Rev 9 (1985); T. Turp, ‘Le
recours en droit international aux fins de l’interprétation de la Charte canadienne des droits et
libertés: un bilan jurisprudentiel’, 18 R J Thémis 353 (1984); M. Cohen and A. F. Bayefsky, ‘The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law’, 61 Canadian Bar
Rev 265 (1983); J. Claydon, ‘International Human Rights Law and the Interpretation of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, 4 Supreme Court L Rev 287 (1982); E. P. Mendes,
‘Interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Applying International and
European Jurisprudence on the Law and Practice of Fundamental Rights’, 20 Alberta L Rev
383 (1982); and, G. Tremblay, ‘La Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et quelques leçons de
la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’, 23 C de D 795 (1982). See also, with regard
to the Quebec provincial human rights legislation, M. Caron, ‘L’utilisation du droit
international aux fins d’interprétation et d’application de la Charte des droits et libertés de la
personne du Québec’, 1 Rev Québ D Int’l 307 (1984).
77 [1987] 1 SCR 313.
78 [1989] 1 SCR 1038.
79 [1990] 3 SCR 697.
80 [2001] 1 SCR 283.
reasons why a court ought to resort to international law when asked to
interpret implementing legislation:
Since the purpose of the [Immigration] Act incorporating Article IF(C)
[of the Refugees Convention] is to implement the underlying
Convention, the Court must adopt an interpretation consistent with
Canada’s obligations under the Convention. The wording of the
Convention and the rules of treaty interpretation will therefore be
applied to determine the meaning of Article IF(C) in domestic law.74
This in effect means that, along with international law used as an element of
context to determine legislative intent, resort should also be had to inter-
national law’s principles of interpretation, now codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,75 when considering such instruments.
To put this paradigm shift at the Supreme Court into perspective, the
Charter should be credited at least in part for this change of approach which
has led to the much more liberal consultation of international law. Indeed,
since the adoption of the Charter in 1982, legal commentators have advocated
recourse to international instruments to help in the construction of consti-
tutionally protected rights and freedoms.76 The Supreme Court responded by
adopting just such a method of interpreting the constitution—Reference Re
Public Service Employee Relations Act,77 Slaight Communications Inc. v. David-
son,78 R. v. Keegstra,79 and again more recently in R. v. Burns.80 There can be
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81 Justices Cory and Iacobucci wrote a set of concurring reasons, actually pointing out their
disagreement in using unimplemented treaty obligations in interpreting Canadian domestic
legislation.
82 GA Res 44/25, 44 UN GAOR, Supp (No 49), UN Doc A/44/49 at 166 (1989), adopted 20
November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990; reprinted in 28 ILM 1448 (1989) and Can.
TS 1992 No 3 (hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child).
83 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé referred to Francis v. Queen [1956] SCR 618 at 621; and, Capital Cities
Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission [1978] 2 SCR 141 at 172–73.
84 Baker, at para. 69–70 [emphasis added].
little doubt that opening the door to such use of international law for
constitutional interpretation influenced the attitude for the construction of
ordinary statutes.
3.2. Recent developments at the Supreme Court of Canada
The most recent developments at the Supreme Court of Canada in terms of
the role of international law in statutory interpretation came out of the
decisions in Baker, Hudson and Suresh. Now, before evaluating whether the
Schreiber case constitutes a break in the modern approach just identified, a
brief examination of the latest judgments that exemplify this trend is certainly
in order.
3.2.1. The Baker case
In this case, the Supreme Court had to decide whether or not an order to
deport a woman with Canadian-born dependent children should be
reviewed. The appellant had applied for an exemption based on humani-
tarian and compassionate considerations under section 114(2) of the Immi-
gration Act. The scope of ‘humanitarian and compassionate consideration’
was ascertained by the majority, per Justice L’Heureux-Dubé,81 having regard
to the Minister’s guidelines and also in light of international law. Because the
interests of children, protected in the Convention on the Rights of the Child,82
fall within humanitarian and compassionate reasons not to deport, this
international instrument was considered as an element of legislative context.
This convention was ratified by Canada but has yet to be implemented into
the domestic legal order which, according to the traditional position,83 meant
that the norms contained therein could not directly apply to the case at hand.
It is here that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé made the following groundbreaking
remarks:
I agree with the respondent and the Court of Appeal that the
Convention has not been implemented by Parliament. Its provisions
therefore have no direct application within Canadian law. Nevertheless,
the values reflected in international human rights law may help inform the
contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.84
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85 R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd edn (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at
330.
86 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé referred to the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Tavita
v. Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 at 266; and to a judgment by the Supreme Court of
India, Vishaka v. Rajasthan [1997] 3 LRC 361 at 367.
87 Baker, at para. 71.
88 GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810, 71 (1948), adopted 10 December 1948, in its preamble.
89 GA Res 1386 (XIV), 14 UN GAOR, Supp (No 16), UN Doc A/4354, 19, adopted 20 November
1959; in its preamble.
90 RSC 1985, c P–9.
91 RSQ, c P–9.3.
92 RSQ, c C–19, as ammended (hereinafter Cities and Towns Act).
A reference to Driedger on the Construction of Statutes85 followed, explaining
that international law (both treaties and custom) forms part of the legal
context in which legislative interpretation is conducted. Other common law
countries, it was also observed, have recognized the role of international
human rights in construing domestic law.86
Accordingly, the majority felt justified to take into account the values and
principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, more particularly
those concerning the best interests of children and how they should be
considered when making decisions relating to and affecting their future.87
Other international instruments providing protection for children and
childhood were considered by L’Heureux-Dubé J, including the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights88 and the 1959 Declaration of the
Rights of the Child.89 Such international rules were thus used as part of the
legislative context for the interpretation of section 114(2) of the Immigration
Act and helped decide that the Minister’s power had been exercised
unreasonably.
3.2.2. The Hudson case
In Hudson, reference was made to Baker, and international law was also
resorted to as an aid to the interpretation of the domestic legislation at issue.
Unlike Baker, however, there was no unimplemented treaty obligation. Here,
the appellants were companies providing landscaping and lawn care
services, in the course of which they used pesticides approved by the Federal
Pest Control Products Act;90 they had also obtained the requisite licences
under the Pesticides Act,91 a Quebec statute. The city of Hudson, the
respondent, charged the appellants with pesticides use in violation of
municipal by-law no. 270, which was adopted pursuant to the enabling
legislation. The appellants argued that this by-law was ultra vires of the
town’s authority.
The statutory interpretation question concerned the extent of legislative
authority enjoyed by the respondent to regulate the use of pesticides on its
territory, which was provided for in the Cities and Towns Act.92 Justice
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93 Justices Iacobucci, Major and LeBel wrote a set of concurring reasons.
94 Above n 85 at 330.
95 On this, see the recent literature by D. VanderZwaag, ‘The Precautionary Principle in
Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces’, 8 J Environmental L &
Pol 355 (1998); T. O’Riordan, J. Cameron and A. Jordan (eds), Reinterpreting the Precautionary
Principle (London: Cameron May, 2001); and A. Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the
Precautionary Principle in International Law (The Hague and Boston: Kluwer Law International,
2002).
96 A/CONF 151/PC/10, 6 August 1990, at para. 7: ‘In order to achieve sustainable development,
policies must be based on the precautionary principle. Environmental measures must
anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.’
97 Hudson, at para. 31.
98 SC 1996, c 31, at para. 6 of the preamble.
99 SC 1999, c 33, at s 2(1)(a).
100 SNS 1998, c 11, at ss 2(1)(h) and 11(1).
101 The sources of international law are generally regarded as being those provided for in art 38(1)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1 UNTS xvi, which reads: ‘The Court, whose
function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it,
shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.’
102 See Hudson, at para. 32.
L’Heureux-Dubé, for the majority,93 recalled her reasons in Baker and referred
again to Driedger on the Construction of Statutes,94 this time to support the
proposition that both treaties and customary international law should inform
the contextual interpretation of domestic statutes. It is the so-called pre-
cautionary principle at international law that was used in this case to confirm
the conclusion according to which section 410(1) of the Cities and Towns Act
and by-law 270 allow the respondent to regulate pesticide use on its
territory.95
The Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Developments96 gave a
definition to the precautionary principle and L’Heureux-Dubé J observed
that it was now ‘codified in several items of domestic legislation’97—the
Oceans Act,98 the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999,99 and Nova
Scotia’s Endangered Species Act.100 In terms of sources of international law,
however, the nature of the principle at hand remained unclear.101 Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé made no reference to treaty provisions (implemented or
not), which seems to indicate that the rule she was alluding to was
customary.102 In any event, be it customary or conventional, and irrespective
of whether or not the latter is incorporated into the domestic legal order,
international law was deemed relevant in deciding that the Cities and Towns
Act authorized the regulation of pesticide use.
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103 Immigration Act, s 53(1).
104 ‘A complete understanding of the [Immigration Act] and the Charter requires consideration of
the international perspective;’ Suresh at para. 59.
105 Suresh, at para. 60 [emphasis added].
106 The Court referred to the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75
UNTS 135, adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950; reprinted in Can. TS
1965 No 20, 84; at art 3; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 75 UNTS 31, adopted 12 August 1949,
3.2.3. The Suresh case
In Suresh, the Supreme Court was asked to review the Minister of Immi-
gration’s decision to deport the appellant, who had been recognized as a
refugee under the Refugees Convention. The Immigration Act—which, inter
alia, incorporates international norms on refugees into Canadian law—states
that there must be no refoulement ‘to a country where a person’s life or
freedom would be threatened for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political group or political
opinion’.103 However, there is an exception under the Immigration Act
authorizing such deportation for reasons of national security, which was the
basis for the order to deport the appellant who was suspected of terrorist
activities. The invoked grounds for judicial review included procedural
unfairness and Charter right infringements.
In order to determine whether the Immigration Act, s 53(1)(b), which
allows deportation ‘to a country where the person’s life or freedom would be
threatened’, infringes the constitutional principles of fundamental justice in
article 7 of the Charter, the situation at international law was examined by ‘the
Court’.104 Similar to the majority in Baker (to which, however, there was no
reference here), unimplemented treaty norms were held to be useful for
interpretation purposes:
International treaty norms are not, strictly speaking, binding in Canada
unless they have been incorporated into Canadian law by enactment.
However, in seeking the meaning of the Canadian Constitution, the Court may
be informed by international law. Our concern is not with Canada’s
international obligation qua obligations; rather, our concern is with the
principles of fundamental justice. We look to international law as
evidence of these principles and not as controlling in itself.105
Unlike Baker, however, where such norms were used by the majority to
ascertain the meaning of domestic legislation (section 114(1) Immigration
Act), here, it was to construe a constitutional right enshrined in the Charter
(the principles of fundamental justice in section 7) that the Court made
reference to international law.
From an international perspective, the prohibition on torture was first held
to be a rule of ius cogens. This was evidenced by (i) the large number of
multilateral instruments prohibiting torture,106 (ii) the domestic state practice
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entered into force 21 October 1950; reprinted in Can. TS 1965 No 20, 25; at art 3; the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 UNTS 85, adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21
October 1950; reprinted in Can. TS 1965 No 20, 55; at art 3; the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 UNTS 287, adopted 12 August 1948,
entered into force 21 October 1950; reprinted in Can. TS 1965 No 20, 163; at art 3; the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights above n 88; at art 5; the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, GA Res 3452 (XXX), UN Doc A/10034, 91 (1976), adopted 9 December 1975;
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see above n 85; at art 7; the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221,
ERS 5.41, signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953; at art 3; the American
Convention on Human Rights, OASTS 36, signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July
1978; OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/11.23, doc 21, rev.6 (1979); reprinted in 9 ILM 673 (1970); at
art 5; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3, adopted
27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986; reprinted in 21 ILM 58 (1981), and 7 HRLJ 403;
at art 5; the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, 9 The Muslim World League
Journal 25 (1981), at article VII.
107 Suresh, at para. 63.
108 Reference was made to L. Hannikainen, above n 33, at 509, and M. N. Shaw, International Law,
4th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 203–04.
109 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija (1998) 38 ILM 317 (1999) (International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber); and, R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate et
al., Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [1999] 2 WLR. 827 (House of Lords).
110 Suresh, at para. 64.
111 GA Res 2200A (XXI), UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, adopted 16 December 1966,
entered into force 23 March 1976; reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967), and Can. TS 1976 No 47
(hereinafter ICCPR).
112 United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth session,
1992), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, UN Doc HRI/Gen/1/Rev.1, 30 (1994), reads: ‘States parties must not expose
individuals to the danger of torture [ . . . ] upon return to another country by way of their
extradition, expulsion, or refoulement.’
113 GA Res 39/46, 39 UN GAOR, Supp (No 51), UN Doc A/39/51, 197 (1984), reprinted in 23 ILM
1027 (1984), minor changes reprinted in 24 ILM 535 (1985), 5 HRLJ. 350 (1984) and Can. TS 1987
No 36 (hereinafter CAT).
114 Suresh, at para. 68.
against torture in the administration of justice,107 and (iii) the doctrinal
works108 and case law109 showing prohibition on torture as such a peremptory
norm.110 Then, the Court referred to regular conventional international
law—articles 4 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)111 (interpreted in light of General Comment No 20)112 as well as
articles 1, 2, 3, and 16 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).113 Ratified but
untransformed into Canadian law, these treaties were relied upon to support
the conclusion that ‘a state is not to expel a person to face torture, which
includes both the physical and mental infliction of pain and suffering,
elsewhere’.114
This general prohibition at international law, however, appears to be
qualified by another treaty which, unlike the previous two, Canada has both
ratified and incorporated into its legal system, namely the Refugee Conven-
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115 Suresh, at para. 72. The Court, in order to support the conclusion that the CAT enjoys a
dominant status in international law referred to, inter alia, United Nations, Committee Against
Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Canada, UN Doc
CAT/C/XXV/Concl. 4 (2000).
116 Suresh, at paras 76–79.
117 Justice LeBel wrote, in Schreiber, at para. 50: ‘In the case at bar, there is no conflict between the
principles of international law, at the present stage of their development, and those of the
domestic legal order. International law sets out some general principles with respect to the
origins and uses of sovereign immunity, but the domestic law sets out very specific exceptions
to the general rule of sovereign immunity’ [emphasis added].
118 Schreiber, at para. 51.
119 Schreiber, at para. 51 [emphasis added].
120 Baker, at para. 70.
tion. After establishing a similar prohibition of refoulement, article 33(2) of this
treaty provides: ‘The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a
danger to the security of the country.’ But the Court rejected the argument
that the anti-deportation provisions in the ICCPR and the CAT could be
derogated from because of the Refugee Convention, holding that the former
instruments expressed a ‘prevailing international norm’.115 Based in part on
this international perspective, the Court concluded that the refoulement of a
person who is likely to face torture, save in the most extraordinary
circumstances, constitutes an unjustifiable infringement of the Charter.116 In
the end, the appellant was entitled to a new deportation hearing.
4. Conclusion
Now, where does Schreiber fit in this trend welcoming recourse to inter-
national law in interpreting domestic statutes? There is little doubt that,
intentionally or not, a very different tone emerged from these reasons, which
spoke of some formal requirement of finding a conflict117 between the
domestic legislative provision and the international legal norm invoked
before the latter can act as an aid to interpretation. With all due respect to
Justice LeBel, who is certainly one of the liberal interpreters on the bench, it is
difficult to read the relevant passages otherwise than as clashing with
contemporary case law on the issue.
Indeed, it was held in Schreiber that the ‘questions at stake fall within the
purview of the domestic legislation’,118 and that ‘the case turns on the
interpretation of the bilingual versions of section 6(a) of State Immunity Act,
discussed [above], rather than the interpretation of international law prin-
ciples’.119 This attitude greatly contrasts with the discourse recently expressed
by the Court, most forcefully in Baker, suggesting the unimpeded consider-
ation of international legal norms ‘to help inform the contextual approach to
statutory interpretation’.120 The latter approach calls for the reconciliation of
domestic and international norms through interpretation, while that adopted
in Schreiber seems to favour a compartmented, even perhaps confrontational,
MFK-Mendip Job ID: 9932BK--0040-4   4 -    37  * Rev: 16-12-2003 PAGE: 1 TIME: 09:09 SIZE: 63,09 Area: JNLS OP: PB
9932 – OUP: STATUTE LAW REVIEW (25:1)
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CANADIAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 37
121 See Re Canada Labour Code, above n 66; Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, above n 68; Thomson
v. Thomson, above n 71; and, Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
above n 73.
122 Above n 53.
123 Ibid, at 541 [emphasis added].
124 Above n 56 and accompanying text.
125 See, for instance, C. B. Nutting, ‘The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes’, 24 Minnesota L
Rev 509 (1940).
126 [1993] AC 593 (HL).
127 Ibid, at 620.
128 On the different types of ambiguous, obscure or unclear legislation, see T. St J.N. Bates, ‘The
Contemporary Use of Legislative History in the United Kingdom’, 54 Cambridge L J 127, at
139–45 (1995).
129 See R. Sullivan, above n 85, at 430; and, J. M. Kernochan, ‘Statutory Interpretation: An Outline
of Method’, 3 Dalhousie L J 333, at 343–44 (1976).
130 F. Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1882) at 85.
131 H. F. Stone, ‘The Common Law in the United States’, 50 Harvard L Rev 4, at 15 (1936).
view of the two orders. Further, such reluctance to use international law is all
the more surprising given that the State Immunity Act is an implementing
statute, that is, the type most appropriately involving reference to such norms
in ascertaining legislative intent, according to the Court.121
More troublesome is LeBel J’s reference to Daniels v. White122 as the
authority on the use of international law in statutory interpretation. In that
case, Pigeon J wrote that ‘if a statute is unambiguous, its provisions must be
followed even if they are contrary to international law’.123 This excerpt
unearths the Chung Chi Cheung124 terminology and suggests that international
law will prevail over—not reconcile with—Canadian law when the domestic
statute is clear, that is, when there is no ambiguity on the meaning of the
legislative provision. The fundamental problem which arises with such a test,
many times highlighted by general commentators on statutory interpret-
ation,125 is to decide whether the legislation is ambiguous or unambiguous. As
Lord Oliver of Aylmerton noted in Pepper v. Hart:126 ‘Ingenuity can sometimes
suggest ambiguity or obscurity where none exists in fact.’127
Furthermore, this ‘ambiguity requirement’128 constitutes a manifestation of
the rhetoric of the literal rule of statutory interpretation, otherwise known as
the plain meaning rule.129 This restrictive approach to legislation was born in
Great Britain at a time when courts considered that ‘Parliament generally
changes the law for the worse’130 and that a statute was an ‘alien intruder in
the house of the common law’.131 The plain meaning rule has long been
criticized by courts and commentators, and it now appears to be rejected in
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132 See, for example, the following authors: N. J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, vol 2A,
5th edn (New York: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1992) at 2–3; and, M. Zander, The Law-Making
Process, 4th edn (London: Butterworths, 1994), at 121–27. As far as the judiciary is concerned, in
England, see Lord Denning’s speech in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport
Corporation [1950] 2 All ER 1226, at 1236 (CA): ‘We sit here to find out the intention of
Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the gaps and
making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis. In the United
States of America, see Holmes J’s comments in Towne v. Eisner, 245 US 372, at 376 (1917): ‘A
word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought;’ see also
Learned Justice Hand, in Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F2d 608, at 624 (2nd Cir 1944), who wrote:
‘There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.’
133 Above n 121.
134 Ibid, at 617.
135 [1996] 3 SCR 919.
136 Ibid, at para. 154 [emphasis in original].
137 F. A. R. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 2nd edn (London: Butterworths, 1992), at
427–29. What is referred to as the ‘informed interpretation’ is called the ‘modern interpretation
rule’ by R. Sullivan (above n 85, at 131–35) and ‘pragmatic dynamism’ by W. N. Eskridge
(Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Cambridge, U.S.: Harvard University Press, 1994), at 50–57).
138 See P.-A. Côté, Interprétation des lois, 3rd edn (Montreal: Thémis, 1999), at 364–73.
139 [1988] 1 SCR 513.
140 [1996] 3 SCR 550.
141 [1997] 1 SCR 411.
142 Above n 42.
143 [1999] 1 SCR 688.
most common law jurisdictions.132 In Pepper v. Hart,133 Lord Griffiths
appositely observed:
The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict
constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the
literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a purposive
approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation
and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon
the background against which the legislation was enacted.134
As Justice L’Heureux-Dubé wrote, dissenting in 2747–3174 Québec Inc. v.
Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool):135 ‘In reality, the “plain meaning” can be
nothing but the result of an implicit process of legal interpretation’.136
The legislative intent now predominantly tends to be ascertained with
reference to a much broader perspective, through a modern approach that the
commentator Francis Bennion calls the ‘informed interpretation’.137 Pursuant
to this method, when one is asked to construe a statute, one ought to put the
emphasis not only on the language used, but also equally on the purpose and
context of the enactment.138 This is the approach that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
began to advocate in Hills v. Canada (Attorney General)139 in 1988, and which
seems to have become dominant at the Supreme Court during the 1990s, with
judgments like Verdun v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,140 Royal Bank of Canada v.
Sparrow Electric Corp.,141 Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.,142 R. v. Gladue,143 and again in
the 2002 case of Bell ExpressVu.
Accordingly, it is with some concerns that the author is forced to conclude
that Schreiber indeed seems to signal a change of heart by the Supreme Court
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144 Above n 51.
145 On the creation and transformation of human constructed reality through the use of language
and myth, see L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1961); and, L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958); as
well as C. K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning—A Study of the Influence of
Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism, 2nd edn (London: Kegan Paul, 1927).
of Canada with regard to the use of international law in domestic statutory
interpretation. More alarming would be to think of the reference made to
Daniels v. White,144 and the misleading discourse on ‘ambiguity,’ as a step
backward in favour of the plain meaning rule of construction, which semiotic
effect on the shared consciousness of the legal community, including that of
our magistrates, continues in spite of the relentless efforts of some members
of our highest court to rid us of this mythical reality.145
